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the inheritance tax by directing the tax to be paid out of the residue
of his estate. The West Virginia court did not seem concerned
about this method of escaping the inheritance tax, and said that
there were other examples of tax saving which had been written
into the act itself.
If the West Virginia Legislature does not amend the inheritance
tax, the available savings could be substantial. f the tax rate were,
for example, ten per cent, and testator I wished to leave 60,000 dollars to A, a tax of 6,000 dollars would result. If T were to provide
that A get 54,000 dollars and the inheritance tax be paid out of the
estate, the tax would amount to only 5,400 dollars and a tax saving
of 600 dollars could be realized. Until such change occurs, the
payment of such taxes from the residuary clause offers an attractive technique for tax saving.
Robert Glenn Steele

Torts-Statutes of Limitations-Malpractice Actions
Involving Objects Left in Surgical Patients
P underwent an operation on April 26, 1955, and after receiving post-operative attention, was discharged from the hospital
on May 5, 1955. Her last visit to D, a physician, was on November
14, 1955. After the operation P constantly suffered from back
trouble and was X-rayed to determine the cause in August, 1958.
The X-rays disclosed a wing nut in her abdomen. P instituted an
action against D on August 13, 1959, for his negligence during the
operation. The lower court held that P's action was barred by the
two-year statute of limitations. Held, reversed. The statute of limitations on a cause of action for malpractice based on negligent failure
to remove a foreign object from patient's body during the course
of an operation began to. r n when the patient kiew or had redson
to know about the foreign object and existence of a cause of -action
based upon its presence. Fernandi v. Strully, 173 A.2d 277 (N.J.
1961).
The issue presented to the court in the principal case is one
that has arisen many times and one that has been ruled on by many
courts throughout the land. By its present decision, the New Jersey
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Supreme Court has made its state the third of a growing minority
which rules, in effect, that in the present type of malpractice case,
the statute of limitations begins to run when the patient knew or
had reason to know about the foreign object in his body, and not
when this object was negligently left there.
The majority of courts, in interpreting their respective state
statutes, have held that the statute of limitations begins to run, not
at the time when the patient knew or had reason to know of the
doctor's neeigent act, but at the time when the negligent act occurred. Only in Arkansas and Missouri is there no opportunity
for judicial interpretation of such statutes as the legislatures of
both states have explicitly set out the time at which the cause of
action accrues in malpractice cases. See ARK. STATS. §§ 37-205 cited
in Crossett Health Center v. Crosswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d
548 (1953); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1012 (1939) cited in Thatcher
v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943). In Hungerford
v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1961), the court,
in applying the law of the state of Washington, held that plaintiff's
claim for continuation of a brain injury resulting from negligence
of physician "accrued" at the time of such negligence and was
barred by limitations. Other decisions supporting the majority view
are found in Wilder v. St. Joseph Hosp., 225 Miss. 42, 82 So. 2d
651 (1955), sponges left in plaintiff's body; Shearin v. Lloyd, 246
N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957), failure to remove lap-pack from
patient's abdomen before closing appendectomy incision; DeLong
v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952), sponges
left in plaintiff's body; Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash. 2d 675, 277
P.2d 724 (1954), failure to remove a surgical sponge prior to closing
a hernia incision.
The West Virginia Supreme Court, in interpreting W. VA.
ch. 55, art. 2, § 12 (Michie 1955), also has held that the
cause of action against a physician who negligently left a hemostat
in plaintiff's body accrued at the time of the operation, and that
in the absence of actual knowledge, fraud, or concealment on the
part of the defendant, the one-year statute of limitations would
not be tolled and the action was therefore barred. Gray v. Wright,
142 W. Va. 490, 96 S.E.2d 67 (1957).
While the majority rule generally prevails, many courts have
recognized the harshness found in it and have used several different
approaches to alleviate the inequities created. In Gillette v. Tucker,
CODE
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67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902), the court theoretically postponed the commission of the tort to the time of severance of the
professional relationship between doctor and patient. This, the
court noted, would serve to "postpone the running of the statute
until it is reasonably possible for the victim of the continuous
tortious conduct to discover the wrong." This idea of tolling the
statute until the end of treatment by the physician has found recent
support in Summers v. Wallace Hosp., 276 F.2d 831 (9th Cir.
1960), interpreting the law of the state of Idaho; Borgia v. City of
New York, 216 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1961); and Dowell v.
Mossberg, 355 P.2d 624 (Ore. 1960). Although this rule somewhat relieves the burden placed upon plaintiff when the factual
situation permits its application, it is, at best, only a compromise
measure. In those jurisdictions adhering to this rule, if the patient
is released from the hospital without undergoing any post-operative
treatment, or at most undergoes such treatment for a very short
period of time, but yet discovers the surgeon's negligence at a time
beyond that provided by the statute of limitations, no protection
is afforded him in bringing his action. Although some attempt has
been made under this rule to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to
bring an action, it does not appear to readily solve the present
problem.
In Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959), the
plaintiff underwent an operation for an ulcer. Several years later,
a sponge was discovered in her abdomen, having negligently been
left there by the defendant-surgeon. When plaintiff instituted legal
action, defendant contended that the action was barred by the twoyear statute of limitations. This contention was rejected by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court which stressed that the statute of limitations must be read in the light of reason and common sense. In
its opinion, several "fictions" were created by the court to support
its decision, these being: (1) that the operation was "not completed" until the sponge was removed; (2) that the injury to the
plaintiff did not become a reality until "the sponge began to break
down the healthful tissue within the body"; and (3) that the defendant's failure to remove the sponge constituted "blameworthiness
which continued" until the plaintiff "learned, or by the exercise of
reasonable diligence, could have learned of the presence of the
foreign substance within his body."
In Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944),
although there was no suggestion that the defendants knew of the
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failure to remove a gauze pad negligently left during plaintiff's operation, the court expressed the view that the matter could be treated
in the same fashion as the fraudulent concealment cases where the
statute is widely deemed to be tolled. The court, in Burton v. Tribble,
189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934), rejected a contention that
plaintiff's legal action was barred by limitations, describing the
doctor's failure to discover and disclose the presence of a ball of
gauze in plaintiff's abdominal cavity as "constructive fraud."
The first telling blow against strict construction of limitations
statutes in malpractice cases came in Huysman v. Kirsh, 6 Cal. 2d
302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936). In this case the defendant-surgeon closed
the plaintiff's wound without removing a drainage tube which had
been carelessly left in her abdomen. Although she did not institute
her action until after the lapse of a year from the date of the operation, the court unanimously held that she was not barred by
the one-year statute. A supporting theory for this decision was
that the statutory period of limitations may be viewed as not beginning to run until the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have
known of her condition. This approach has repeatedly been adopted
in California. See Tell v. Taylor, 12 Cal. Rep. 648 (Dist. Ct. App.
1961), and cases cited therein. This view has also been adopted
in Florida. City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954).
The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized the merit of
the view propounded by the courts of California and Florida. Although New York has not yet accepted this view, it has been
recognized in that jurisdiction that it is within the competence of
courts to change the law with respect to the time when a cause
of action for medical malpractice arises, as between the time the
negligent act is committed and the time the injury or damage is
discovered. Dorfman v. Schoenfeld, 203 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Sup. Ct.
1960). This principle is one that should not merely be accepted
by the highest courts in the United States, but is one which should
be put into practice. The time is definitely ripe for a proper determination as to when the cause of action does accrue and, consequently,
as to that time when the statute of limitations begins to run in this
"class of malpractice cases." This determination should be in accord
with the rulings in California, Florida, and now, New Jersey.
Aaron David Trub
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